Guerrilla Warfare Page 16

  George Wilhelm von Valentini (subsequently a Prussian lieutenant-general) was only twenty-four years of age when his book was published, by which time he was already a veteran of the wars of 1792-1796.23 He based his book partly upon his own experience in the field of partisan warfare and also upon that of others, such as Ewald, although their views were often contradictory.* Valentini believed that a small war could be decisive in the last resort. The French tirailleurs had harassed the Austrians like a pack of hounds in the winter campaign of 1793, compelling them to retreat though not a single major encounter had taken place. (Almost a century earlier, Maurice de Saxe had compared an army without light cavalry units to a knight in heavy armor who has been forced to retreat in disgrace by a crowd of schoolboys throwing sticks and stones.) According to Valentini, the early campaigns of the revolutionary wars were an excellent school for small warfare. The French had employed small-war tactics on a massive scale, conducting a war of destruction against the enemy forces. On the other hand Valentini argued not very convincingly that the fighting in the Vendée and in the Tyrol was not small warfare.24 He thought that mountaineers and hunters were the most likely candidates for partisan warfare; those without such natural training would need to be highly educated and young. With regard to the essential qualities needed by a commander of a partisan unit, Valentini agreed with other authors on the topic that much would depend on his ability to make quick decisions; a brave officer was able to challenge fortune against overwhelming odds, indeed against all the laws of probability. Above all, he needed moral force, the charisma to inspire officers and men in a decisive moment. Of great interest are Valentini's remarks on surprise attacks. He noted that the Croats were once past masters of this art but seemed to have lost their talent. He believed that if surprise were complete the enemy would offer little resistance even though his forces might be numerically superior. However, well-disciplined troops were needed for a surprise attack; infantry units should carry out the attack by night, holding a cavalry detachment in reserve to pursue the enemy troops in their flight.

  Of the leading strategic thinkers of the period, Napoleon paid little attention to the problem of small warfare. Other French military leaders had thought highly of partisans; Maurice de Saxe had said that a brave parti with three hundred or four hundred men could create utter chaos amongst an entire army. Napoleon's comments on partisan warfare were totally negative. The affair in the Vendée had been a simple case of brigandage, very much in contrast to the Spartacus revolt which had been led by a great man, aspiring to the human ideal of liberty. The Vendéeans just wanted to rob and destroy, they had established a veritable république des anarchistes, while professing to fight for the Church and monarchy. True, the rising had been popular and spontaneous to begin with but the insurgents later became the tools of the British. The rebellion would have been nipped in the bud had the local administration been any good, and Kléber and Marceau been given a free hand from the very beginning.

  In Napoleon's eyes, the Cossacks were cowards and wretches, the "scum of the earth"; if he had been defeated in Russia, it was through a series of accidents, by General Morozov (frost) rather than by Marshal Kutuzov. The German free corps (such as Lützow's) were "hideous militias"; what would the great Frederick have said about such soldiers? Napoleon wrote of the Spanish soldiers in 1808 that it was impossible to find worse troops anywhere in the world; they could not fight in the mountains or on the plains. They were ignorant, cowardly and cruel; the monks and the inquisition had destroyed this nation. But in retrospect Napoleon modified his views: he wrote in exile that the Spanish en masse had acquitted themselves like honorable men. His own subsequent misfortunes had their origins in Spain without exception; he had had to divide his forces, therewith exacerbating all his problems and detrimentally affecting his image throughout Europe. But his Spanish experience did not affect his views about partisan and people's wars. The Prussian Landsturm was barbaric in inspiration; levée en masse would always cause terrible trouble.25

  Guibet, an erratic and unorthodox military writer, who opposed big armies and thought that the role of artillery and fortification had been much inflated, nevertheless did not gravitate towards petite guerre.26 On the contrary, he regarded light mobile units as superfluous and an artificial innovation. Since armies had become so big and unwieldy, something had to be created to give employment to those who were underemployed, but it was a mistake to copy the Austrian example of employing small, semi-independent, light cavalry units. It was a gross exaggeration to claim that these units were one of the most useful corps in an army; small war could never be decisive.

  Dietrich von Bülow, like Guibet, was an eccentric thinker, with occasional flashes of genius. He published his comments on the "modern system of warfare" citing Carnot as his main hero and the open formation of tirailleurs as the key to success. He was among the first to realize that the old linear drill of Frederick the Great was not only incompatible with elementary human dignity, it was also militarily ineffective. He foresaw that all infantry would become light infantry, and expected skirmishes rather than major battles to become the main feature of modern war.27 But again, like Guibet, he saw no room for partisan warfare in the modern system. Bülow advocated "human tactics" against the outmoded clockwork practices of the eighteenth century. The old-style soldier had been treated and had behaved like a slave; modern war put a premium on individual courage, intellect and initiative. But at the same time he saw the mobilization of the masses and numerical superiority as the only decisive factor in a future war; hence his disregard of small warfare.

  The experience of the American War of Independence, as he saw it, had been unhelpful. He wrote scathingly about the lack of discipline among the North American militias whose soldiers came and went to war as they saw fit.28 That the Americans prevailed in the end was mainly due to Washington's political (not military) genius and also to the many mistakes committed by the British who singularly lacked initiative.

  Mention has already been made of Jomini's observations on national wars. He had been at the receiving end in Spain on one of the first occasions when guerrilla warfare was waged on a large scale in modern times. He wrote:

  The spectacle of a spontaneous uprising of a nation is rarely seen; and, though there be in it something grand and noble which commands our admiration the consequences are so terrible that, for the sake of humanity, we ought to hope never to see it.29

  The commander of an occupying force in enemy territory could all too easily find himself in the position of Don Quixote attacking windmills, whereas his opponent knew the most minute, obscure paths, and had friends and relations everywhere to help him. He quoted illustrations from the war in Spain — entire companies had disappeared completely without trace. All the gold in Mexico could not procure reliable information for the French, who received only false trails that led them into snares:

  No army, however disciplined, can contend successfully against such a system applied by a great nation, unless it be strong enough to hold all the essential points of the country, cover its communications and at the same time furnish an active force sufficient to defeat the enemy wherever he may present himself.

  It should be recalled, however, that according to Jomini, guerrilla units would not succeed in holding out for any length of time without the support of regular troops. His belief was shared by other authors of the period who specialized in the study of the art of small wars such as the Austrian Captain Schels who wrote a multivolume opus on the subject.30 Schels and San Juan offered much useful advice but their very attempt to provide a system in minute detail limits the value of their books. Schels was aware that small, highly mobile units could be as valuable as a whole army, but like many subsequent authors he always regarded them as a part of the regular army and did not consider their guerrilla potential.31

  Clausewitz

  Major Clausewitz became a professor at the Prussian war academy in 1810 and, on 15 October of that year, gave the f
irst of 156 lectures, which were spread over nine months, on the subject "small war" (Kleiner Krieg). His copious notes — almost four hundred printed pages — were first published in 1966.32 They provide a detailed analysis of the methods and scope of operations that had been undertaken by units of between twenty and four hundred men. For his illustrations Clausewitz drew heavily on contemporaneous studies of the subject (Ewald, Emmerich, Valentini and, above all, Scharnhorsts Militärisches Taschenbuch). Like these writers he was not concerned with the general political context of the "small war," which he regarded as just an extension of a "big war" by other means. Though he was familiar with events in the Vendée and in Spain, he referred only to regular army units in his lectures, never to insurgents. He was, after all, addressing the lieutenants and captains of the Prussian army, not Chouans or guerrilleros. Nevertheless, from a military point of view his observations are relevant to the development of partisan warfare.

  According to Clausewitz, the small war differed from a big battle in that it involved not only greater courage and temerity but also demanded the utmost caution. Since in a small war the partisans almost always faced superior forces they had to avoid danger whenever possible; otherwise their units would not last long.33 Ideally, such warfare should be carried out by infantry in close collaboration with mounted units. Whenever possible they should march at night and should camp in small detachments in a forest during the day. They should move forward on concealed roads, should obtain food from the most remote villages, and never reveal the total strength of their detachment. If the presence of the unit were discovered by civilians, they should be detained until such time as the soldiers left the area. However, as the raiders depended in so many ways upon the goodwill of the local population it was imperative to treat them in a friendly way. In some cases money would buy goodwill, but it might become necessary to threaten murder and arson. If the raiders could not pay for the food they needed, they should at least give receipts; messengers should always be given gifts.34 Following Ewald (and Sun Tzu) Clausewitz emphasized that secrecy was of paramount importance; few people should know about the intention (and direction) of a raid. Clausewitz provided the most detailed instructions regarding patrols and advance guard duties. The duty of a scout was to observe, not to fight. At night he should not draw his cap over his ears so that he could note every noise. Only one scout at a time should water his horse, and half the number of horses should be saddled at any given moment. Basing himself on the Tyrolean experience, he suggested that in mountainous territory the detachment should take up positions on the heights, not in a narrow pass which could be outflanked.35

  Surprise attacks were best carried out at night, or at midday when the enemy would be cooking in their camps and least prepared to face an onslaught. Causing false alarms in the enemy camp the night before an attack was always advisable, since this would result in less vigilance the following day. Clausewitz was skeptical about the use of artillery in small wars unless the raiders intended to hold the position they had gained. It had become less easy to lay ambushes because advance parties usually moved in front of the main body of a big unit. Nevertheless in difficult terrain such as forests or mountains, there would always be some scope for ambushes — more likely in one's own territory than in the enemy's. What if a small detachment found itself encircled? In most cases small groups of soldiers could fight their way through the enemy lines more easily than bigger units, hence it was advisable to split up the detachment in such an emergency. But a new meeting place should be fixed and every soldier informed accordingly.

  In dealing with specific assignments for the partisans (Partheygänger), Clausewitz singled out the following: to collect intelligence; to arrest enemy couriers; to kidnap enemy generals or other important persons; to destroy bridges and arms stores; to make roads impassable; to seize enemy funds and supplies.36 He thought that it would be exceedingly difficult to kidnap enemy generals in an orthodox war between regular armies, as an operation of this kind called for skill and courage. It was, therefore, more likely to occur in civil and people's wars, and if such an operation were indeed successfully carried out would spread despondency in the enemy camp.*

  Clausewitz strongly advised against a worst-case-expectation strategy. The enemy could not possibly do everything at the same time, he was bound to be more aware of his own weaknesses than his attackers. To take into account all (theoretically) possible dangers was tantamount to magnifying them. Clausewitz doubted whether once the commander had taken a decision, his junior officers should then be consulted since their opinions might only make him waver. When facing capitulation the commander should weigh up the alternatives of a last counterattack or an order to disperse, thus giving the officers and soldiers a chance to escape.37

  Scharnhorst And Gneisenau

  The Spanish experience inspired Scharnhorsts and Gneisenau's drafts and memoranda proposing the establishment of a national militia (Landsturm) in Prussia (1808 and 1811). The aim of the Prussian military reformers was to hinder the enemy's advance and bar his retreat, to keep him continually on the move, to capture his ammunition, food, supplies, couriers and recruits, to seize his hospitals, and to attack him by night, in short, harassing, tormenting, tiring and destroying him either individually or in his units wherever possible.38 To that end the militia was to be trained in guerrilla tactics and to use them so that the main body of the enemy army would be virtually cut off, without information, unable to send out small detachments to obtain fresh supplies or patrol the vicinity. They were to pursue a scorched-earth policy — villages were to be destroyed, food and drink burned or spoiled, horses and cattle removed. Such revolutionary measures, especially in Gneisenau's radical version, were anathema to a bureaucracy which regarded order and obedience as its supreme values; the enemy should be fought, to be sure, but not at the price of utter chaos. When, after Napoleon's retreat from Russia, Prussia joined the war against France, the Landsturm was ordered to assist the regular army in its operations and was given no opportunity to make use of the tactics proposed by the reformers.

  Small War Doctrine After Napoleon

  The study of small warfare led a modest existence throughout the second half of the nineteenth century and up to the First World War. Though not entirely forgotten it was on the whole neglected, surprisingly so in view of the fact that so many small wars were being fought at that time all over the world. The Napoleonic wars themselves had generated sufficient interest for several important studies, the more noteworthy of which were the works of Le Miére de Corvey, Decker, Stolzman and Chrzanowski (French, Prussian and two Polish officers, respectively).39

  Jean Frederic Auguste Le Miére de Corvey, who was born in Rennes in 1770 and died of cholera in Paris in 1832, was better known in his lifetime as a composer than as a strategist. He wrote several operas (including La Blonde et la Brune, [1795]) and symphonies (including La Bataille de Jena), he arranged Rossini's The Lady of the Lake, based on Sir Walter Scott's poem, and Tancred; on one occasion he even put a newspaper article on Custine's defense of Mainz into music. But he also had a military career; significantly he had started as a sub-lieutenant in the Vendée, continued as aide-de-camp to General Thibaud in Belgium, Germany and Spain, and ended his career as lieutenant-colonel at the Battle of Waterloo. His work on partisan warfare, published in 1823, which heavily relied on his experience in the Vendée and Spain, was in some respects the first truly modern work on the guerrilla.40

  Le Mière was struck by the tactics of the Vendeans which, in contrast to most of his fellow officers, he did not regard as primitive and atavistic but as essentially novel. He tended, if anything, to exaggerate the amount of damage inflicted on the French, estimating that they lost half a million people at the hands of the guerril leros in Spain. He noted the similarity between warfare in the Vendée and Spain and argued that far from belittling these lessons (as almost all other military writers were doing), they should be carefully studied and drawn upon by others in the event of a
foreign invasion.41 Civilians normally would not take up arms against regular troops: it was difficult to imagine, for instance, the merchants of Paris constituting themselves into a fighting force. But this situation might suddenly alter if the house of a civilian was destroyed and his wife or children killed. Thus, there was something to be learned by all European nations from the guerrilla experience. True, some areas were better suited than others, especially mountainous regions such as the Pyrenees, the Alps or the Vosges in France, Scotland, the Tyrol or Greece. In his work, Le Mière traced partisan warfare throughout the ages and noted that while partisans were frequently used as a corollary to regular armies, they assumed far greater importance once the national armies had been, destroyed. He concluded from a detailed analysis of the Spanish experience that it was not sufficient for an invader to seize the major towns since his lines of communication would still remain open to attack. Traditional military doctrine was of little use in combating the partisans. Who were the leaders of the Spanish guerrillas, who defeated the brave French generals in Spain? A miller, a doctor, a shepherd, a curate and some deserters . . .42 He noted, furthermore, that for obvious reasons the local populace would always be the most adept at defending their native regions. He dealt in considerable detail with the organization of guerrilla units, their tactics, their weapons, and even their uniforms. He was less doctrinaire than other authors, recognizing that guerrilla units followed tactics essentially different from those of light units attached to regular armies. And in contrast to other authors, Le Mière put great, perhaps decisive, emphasis on psychological factors. That a guerrilla had to be courageous went without saying — once he was attacked he could not look back. Above all, guerrilla warfare faut un peu de.fanatisme, for this was a war of extermination; the enemy armies would use reprisals and treat the partisans as mere brigands.43 Though the author very much regretted this —for guerres d'opinion (ideological wars) had terrible consequences — he accepted this change in the character of war as an unalterable historical fact.