Guerrilla Warfare Read online

  According to widespread belief, guerrilla warfare is a new way of conducting unconventional war, discovered by a stroke of genius by Mao in the Yenan period, and later successfully applied to other parts of the world by left-wing revolutionary movements. Observers with a longer memory point to Τ. E. Lawrence as the great pioneer of modern guerrilla warfare; some go even further back recalling the Spanish resistance against Napoleon. In actual fact, guerrilla warfare is as old as the hills and predates regular warfare. Primitive warfare was, after all, largely based on surprise, the ambush and similar tactics. But too little is known about the subject and I have not burdened myself with an attempt to search for the roots of guerrilla warfare in prehistoric times.

  The political context of guerrilla warfare has been and continues to be the subject of much confusion. Thus it has been asserted that before the 1930s guerrilla movements were usually parochial, not nationwide in character, that they had little more than nuisance value, and that they were ideologically conservative. Recent guerrilla movements, on the other hand, are said to be revolutionary, no longer spontaneous outbursts but part of a nationwide (or international) political movement, and it is this that gives them greater cohesion than in the past. There is some truth in these observations, but it is certainly not correct that until recently guerrilla movements were all of local importance only. Nor are "wars of national liberation" a twentieth-century innovation. Guerrilla movements of the early nineteenth century were indeed "right wing" in character, intensely patriotic, monarchist, religious-fundamentalist, whereas modern guerrilla movements do appear more often than not to be left wing, revolutionary in inspiration. But on closer inspection it transpires that the issues involved are not that clear-cut. It is not difficult to detect strong populist, antiaristocratic elements among the nineteenth-century guerrillas in Spain, Ireland, Italy, Latin America, and even in the Vendee. On the other hand there were and are many movements which simply do not fit into the obvious categories of "right" and "left." Quite frequently their ideology has encompassed extreme "left" and "right" components (as among the "Fighters for the Freedom of Israel [the Stern Gang] and Dr. Habash's "Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine ). The IRA and the Macedonian IMRO at various times in their history had connections with both Fascism and Communism (or Trotskyism). Latin American guerrilla movements manage to combine a bewildering multitude of conflicting ideological attitudes, and even in Communist-inspired guerrilla movements, nationalism has almost always been the single most important factor.

  How much importance should be attributed then to the political orientation of guerrilla movements? Or, to put it differently: are there perhaps certain basic nationalist-populist-revolutionary impulses underlying their political programs and slogans, a free-floating activism, which may turn "right" or "left' according to political conditions and the changing fashions of the Zeitgeist? As a first step in the right direction a moratorium should be declared on the use of terms such as "Marxist" with regard to guerrillas in Chad and Zaire (even if their leaders have attended courses at the Sorbonne) and with regard to terrorists in places as far afield as Berlin, Beirut, or San Francisco,

  The old term "guerrilla warfare" has been used in this study because there is no better one. Newer theoretical concepts such as "modern revolutionary warfare" or "people's war" can be of use only with regard to a few countries and applied elsewhere they are misleading; not all guerrilla movements are led by a monolithic political party, or a Communist party, or are either a people's war or a war of national liberation.

  The term "urban guerrilla" poses something of a problem for the Student of guerrilla warfare. It is a misnomer and its widespread use is to be regretted. Insurrections and revolts have occurred in towns and so, of course, have acts of terror, but urban guerrilla warfare only on the rarest of occasions. The essence of guerrilla warfare lies in the fact that the guerrilla can hide in the countryside and this, quite self-evidently, is impossible to do in a city. The distinction is of more than academic importance; there have been guerrilla units of ten thousand men and women but an urban terrorist unit seldom, if ever, comprises more than a few people, and urban terrorist "movements" rarely consist of more than a few hundred members.

  What is now commonly called "urban guerrilla" warfare is, of course, terrorism in a new dress. We shall encounter it from time to time in these pages because it has been advocated and practiced as an alternative to or in conjunction with guerrilla warfare. But there was no room in this study for a detailed and systematic analysis of terrorism; I shall return to the subject in a different context. The political importance of urban terror has frequently been overrated, perhaps in view of its highly dramatic (or melodramatic) character and the fact that, unlike guerrilla operations, urban terror usually has many spectators. The attitude of the media towards the "urban guerrilla" reminds one of Τ. E. Lawrence's description of his Arab levies — they thought weapons destructive in proportion to their noise.

  I owe a special debt of gratitude to the Library of the Royal United Services Institution in London. I have also visited or received the assistance of the following collections: the Military Library in Helsinki, the Royal Library in Copenhagen, the National Library in Madrid, the Lenin State Library in Moscow, the Library of the Ministry of National Defense in Paris, the Library of Congress in Washington, the Widener Library at Harvard, the Princeton College Library, the Asaf Simhoni Library at Tel-Aviv University, the British Museum, the Wiener Library, and specialized collections in Stanford, Vienna, Madison, Bern, Florence, Aargau, and Berlin.

  I received advice from colleagues and friends who provided suggestions and criticism and read parts of the manuscript. I am grateful to Aviva Golden, Bernard Krikler, Kimbriel Mitchell and Freda Morrison who provided editorial and research assistance. Dr. David Abshire, chairman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and my other colleagues there, in particular, Mrs. Ethel Eanet, my assistant, have helped me in the course of this study; so did those who work with me at the Institute of Contemporary History and Wiener Library in London. Generous support given by the Ford Foundation enabled me to complete a study that in view of the many difficulties involved may well have otherwise remained unfinished. Parallel to this volume I have edited an anthology on the historical development of guerrilla doctrine and the problem of terrorism will be covered in the third part of what was intended to be an essay and became a trilogy.

  London-Washington, January 1976

  Guerrilla Warfare

  1

  Partisans in History

  Irregular forces and guerrilla tactics are mentioned, perhaps for the first time in recorded history, in the Anastas Papyrus of the fifteenth century B.C. Mursilis, the Hittite king, complains in a letter that "the irregulars did not dare to attack me in the daylight and preferred to fall on me by night." While peeved, Mursilis obviously lived to tell the tale.

  Guerrilla tactics, of course, predate recorded history, as indeed they predate regular warfare. In Melanesia, the chosen practice was for the warriors to attack when the enemy was at its sleepiest and most unwary; the same approach was used by the Kiwai in New Guinea. The southeastern Indians of North America liked to be pursued by the foe so that they could lure him into the hollow of a crescent formation. The mock retreat and the ambush were also known to many other tribes; a classic description is in Joshua 8.

  Generally speaking, primitive people had an aversion to open fighting.1 But surprise and deception have their use in every military conflict and there are basic differences between primitive and guerrilla wars. Far more often than not, the former consisted of sporadic, unorganized sorties, hit-and-run raids, the object being either to plunder or to seek vengeance for some grievance such as trespass, personal injury, or wife stealing. Primitive warfare evolved in small tribal social groups who had no capacity for any sustained effort such as protracted war; the scope of movement was quite restricted, and ideological issues were certainly not involved.

  The Bib
le mentions guerrilla leaders such as Jiftah and David. Of David, it is said that "everyone that was in distress, and everyone that was in debt, and everyone that was discontented gathered themselves unto him; and he became a captain over them." (Samuel 1:22) He used the Judaean desert (Ein Gedi) as a temporary base, engaged in forays in the Hebron area, imposed tribute on the rural population and, with a force of between four hundred men (the Caves of Adullam) and six hundred (the Battle of Ziklag), fought the Amalekites and other enemies. Gideon's night attack at Ein Harod (Judges 6-8) is a good example of exploiting the element of surprise. Of the twenty-two thousand men who were with Gideon, three hundred were chosen and, though there were many more Midianites — "like locusts, and no one could count the number of their camels" — they spread confusion in the enemy camp. The sound of trumpets and the sight of torches (hidden in jugs until the very last moment) created pandemonium and the Midianites turned against each other. To make the attack even more effective, it was launched at the time when the guard was about to change.

  The Maccabaean revolt in 166 B.C. made use of guerrilla tactics in its early phase; Mattathias and his sons went into the mountains and, having no arms, Judah had to pick up the sword of the enemy soldier who fell first. They lived in secret places in the wilderness, "as wild animals do." Judas Maccabaeus launched his attacks mainly by night (Maccabaeans 2:8), while his brother, Jonathan, the second leader of the rebellion, launched raids from his base in the Judaean desert, harassing the enemy and evading frontal encounters; his strength lay in the mobility of his troops and a superior intelligence network.

  In the Jewish war against the Romans, guerrilla units did not play a decisive role; the country was densely populated, and there were no inaccessible mountain ranges or wild forests which could have provided shelter for the insurgents. Josephus describes how the retreat of Cestius Gallus, the governor of Syria, from Jerusalem ended in a rout. Cestius's legions were heavily armed which greatly impeded their march, whereas the Jews who attacked them were traveling light. While the Roman forces moved through open terrain they were relatively safe, but eventually they had to cross a narrow downhill pass where their horses stumbled and the attackers all but annihilated their columns.2 John of Gischala, a military leader in Galilee and a rival of Josephus, is described as little better than a robber — crafty, cunning, motivated not so much by patriotism as by the lust for power and spoils. The initiative in these wars was usually with the Romans, and the internal conflicts in the Jewish camp made an effective use of guerrilla tactics almost impossible.

  The Bar Kochba rebellion (A.D. 132-135) was the last stage in the Jewish war against Rome; caverns and subterranean passages provided the insurgents with hiding places. They avoided open battle and from their footholds in the mountains undertook devastating raids upon the country. When Julius Severus, one of Hadrian's most capable generals, was appointed to suppress the revolt, he quickly realized that there would be no open engagement and that the rebels had to be hunted from their hideouts one by one.3

  There are not many examples of guerrilla tactics in Greek military history. One of the few exceptions was Demosthenes's campaign with three hundred Hoplites in mountainous Aetolia. Thucydides, our main source for this disastrous invasion, relates that the Aetolian forces were scattered and lightly armed, having no defensive armor. They attacked the Athenians with their javelins from a safe distance without much risk to themselves, retreated when the Hoplites advanced, advanced when the Hoplites retreated, and, generally speaking, demoralized the enemy by constant withdrawal and pursuit: in the end the Hoplites got lost in pathless woods and stumbled into ravines from which they could not climb out. The Aetolians ringed them with flames and a hundred and twenty of the Hoplites ("the best soldiers of Athens") fell before their commander decided to retreat.4

  Instances of guerrilla warfare are more frequent in Roman military history — in North Africa, Gaul, Germany, and, above all, in Spain.* Tacfarinas, the elusive Numidian chieftain, caused a great deal of aggravation to the Romans. According to Tacitus, he had served in the Roman army, deserted and collected a group of bandits with whom he undertook his expeditions. Was it a case of "social banditry," a "war of national liberation against the imperialist enemy," or perhaps a mixture of both? The Numidians could not resist the Romans in open battle but they were excellent practitioners of the art of small war; whenever the Romans attacked, they retreated, only to return and harass the Romans when these had ended their onslaught. In the words of Tacitus (Annales, 3:22), the Romans got very tired as a result of these frustrating experiences and it was only when the Numidians left the desert and tried their luck near the coast that they were beaten. Despite various setbacks, Tacfarinas continued his struggle; at one stage he even sent ambassadors to Rome, much to the mortification of Tiberius. It was not until seven years later, when the Romans changed their tactics to using lightly armored soldiers who knew their way in the desert, that they succeeded in defeating Tacfarinas decisively. They came upon him at daybreak with his troops unprepared, horses unsaddled and not even any guards on duty — and that was the end of Tacfarinas and his band (Tacitus, 4:25).

  Arminius the Cheruscan, like Tacfarinas, had served in the Roman army; he was a Roman citizen, a knight and an ally of the Romans. As Varus set out with three legions and auxiliaries, constituting a total of twenty-seven thousand men, for the forest of Teuto burg, he had every reason to suppose that Arminius was a friend. But Arminius was motivated by anything but friendly feelings when he persuaded Varus to move his headquarters from a Rhenish fortress to the Weser. He assumed, quite rightly, that this move would force the Roman leader to disperse his troops and his lines of communication would become vulnerable.5 The first two days of Varus's march having passed uneventfully, on the third he reached the forest. The undergrowth was thick, there were no roads, the constant rain made the ground slippery, and leadership in the Roman camp was deplorable. Suddenly Arminius attacked, there was a mass slaughter and, while in the subsequent eight years the Romans avenged themselves in a series of battles, large and small, they never again succeeded in firmly establishing their rule east of the Rhine.

  The Battle of Teutoburg Forest was an example of a successful large-scale ambush, whereas Julius Caesar, in his conquest of Gaul, encountered something more akin to full-scale guerrilla warfare. Vercingetorix, king of the Arverni and military leader of the tribes that rebelled against the Romans, had no military education and his soldiers were untrained. Having been defeated by Caesar's cavalry, he changed his tactics; Caesar quotes him addressing his fellow chieftains:

  We have to conduct the war quite differently, to cut off the Romans from their food and supply, to destroy isolated detachments. All the open villages and farms from which the Romans can get their provisions will be cut off and the Romans will starve.6

  Vercingetorix realized that, while his own infantry could not face the Romans in open battle, it had the advantage of speed over Caesar's legions which were hampered by their huge baggage trains. His tactic was to tempt Caesar to pursue him through difficult terrain, to tire him out and thereby compel him to disperse his forces. He applied this strategy with considerable success for almost six years against Rome's greatest military genius. It was unfortunate that he had to cope not only with the Romans but also with the impatience and foolishness of his own countrymen, who time and again forced him to commit errors against his better judgment: insisting on his giving battle, for instance, or retreating after a battle into a prepared fortress. In the year 52 B.C. Vercingetorix was enclosed by the Romans in Alesia; Caesar beat off a relieving army and took the fortress by means of circumvallation. Eventually the Gallic leader had to surrender and was executed.

  The elements of guerrilla warfare, such as the evasion of battle, the attempt to wear down the enemy, to attack small detachments in an ambush by day and larger units by night, were not of course a novelty to the Roman generals. They had applied them, more than once, in their own operations. Fabius Cuncta
tor, who had been made dictator after the disaster at Trasimene Lake (217 B.C.) had employed the same expedients against Hannibal. He camped on high ground, nibbling away at the Carthaginians' rear guard, avoiding battle. While Hannibal ravaged the Campania, Fabius used his strategy of exhausting the invaders to good effect and this despite the mounting criticism of his fellow Romans thirsting for a decisive battle. After yet another and even greater Roman disaster (the Battle of Cannae [216 B.C.]), Fabius's conduct of war became official strategy until the Romans were strong enough to pass on to the offensive.

  The examples mentioned so far refer to regular armies using 'small war' tactics because they were not strong enough to apply any others. Guerrilla warfare in the strict sense of the term was endemic in Spain among the Celtic-Iberian and Lusitanian tribes. Inevitably it has raised the question of why. The Roman historians saw the insurgents as mere street robbers and highwaymen (latro-listes); their leader was latronum dux or listarchos.7 There was a great deal of unpolitical banditry (bandolerismo) in Spain in ancient times, as in later centuries, but this hardly explains the emergence of whole armies of thousands of men who defeated numerous Roman legions. Economic and demographic reasons, such as the distribution of land and the density of the population in certain parts of the peninsula, have been adduced to explain this phenomenon. For a long time Spaniards served as mercenaries in the ancient world; to take up arms served as a safety valve. In Hannibal's army which traversed the Alps, Spanish soldiers seem to have outnumbered the Carthaginians. The Iberian and Lusitanian tribes had every reason to hate the Romans for the heavy tributes imposed on them by several generations of praetors and the atrocities committed by Roman troops; above all, the treacherous massacres carried out by Servicius Sulpicius Galba (151-50 B.C.) and Lucius Licinius Lucullus. Thousands were killed; thousands of others were sold as slaves to Gaul.