Guerrilla Warfare Read online

  GUERRILLA WARFARE

  with a new introduction by the author

  Walter Laqueur

  Guerrilla Warfare

  A Historical & Critical Study

  Originally published in 1976 by Little, Brown and Company

  Published 1998 by Transaction Publishers

  Published 2017 by Routledge

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  Copyright © 1998 by Taylor & Francis.

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  Library of Congress Catalog Number: 97-29417

  Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

  Laqueur, Walter, 1921-

  Guerrilla warfare : a historical and critical study / Walter Laqueur, with a new introduction by the author.

  p. cm.

  Originally published: Boston : Little, Brown, 1976.

  Includes bibliographical references and index.

  ISBN 978-0-7658-0406-8 (pbk. : alk. paper)

  1. Guerrilla warfare—History. I. Title.

  U240.L37 1997

  355.02'18—dc21

  97-29417

  CIP

  ISBN-13: 978-0-7658-0406-8 (pbk)

  These problems (of guerrilla warfare) are of very long standing, yet manifestly far from understood — especially in those countries where everything that can be called "guerrilla warfare" has become a new military fashion or craze.

  — Β. Η. LIDDELL HART, Preface to the second edition of Strategy, 1967

  Contents

  Introduction to the Transaction Edition

  Preface

  1 Partisans in History

  2 Small Wars and Big Armies

  3 The Origins of Guerrilla Doctrine

  4 The Twentieth Century (I): Between Two World Wars

  5 The Twentieth Century (II): Partisans against Hitler

  6 The Twentieth Century (III): China and Vietnam

  7 National Liberation and Revolutionary War

  8 Guerrilla Doctrine Today

  9 A Summing Up

  Notes

  Chronology of Major Guerrilla Wars

  Abbreviations

  Bibliography

  Index

  Introduction to the Transaction Edition

  Every book has its history and Guerrilla Warfare is no exception. Together with its sequel Terrorism and two companion volumes (The Guerrilla Reader and The Terrorism Reader) it was part of a wider study such as had not been attempted before—to give a critical interpretation of guerrilla and terrorism theory and practice throughout history. It did not want to provide a general theory of political violence nor did it give instructions on how to conduct guerrilla warfare or terrorist operations. It was read in various countries and established itself as a text. I hope it contributed to the clarification of certain issues not widely understood at the time among the public at large. The book certainly failed to bring about greater semantic clarity; there had been a widespread tendency in the media and our public discourse to equate great war with small war, guerrilla, terrorism, civil war, and banditry (social and asocial), and this has not changed since this book first appeared in 1976. On the contrary, unsuspecting readers consulting major public libraries for guidance on the subject of guerrilla warfare will find under this heading books on the theater, on business practices (especially sales strategies), on education, and on many other fields of human endeavor. The term guerrilla has become very popular; but in the same measure as the application has multiplied, the meaning has become even more diluted. In addition there has been the widespread use of the unfortunate and misleading term "urban guerrilla" as a euphemism for terrorism. Guerrilla has a positive connotation, by and large, whereas terrorism has not, hence the misapplication.

  While the word guerrilla has been very popular, much less attention has been given to guerrilla warfare than to terrorism even though the former has been politically more successful: Most terrorist groups have failed; many guerrilla movements have succeeded. The reasons for the lack of attention are obvious: Guerrilla operations, in contrast to terrorist, take place far from big cities, in the countryside, in remote mountainous regions, or in jungles. In these remote areas there are no film cameras or recorders. This fact has been recognized early on by some guerrilla leaders who decided, unwisely in some cases, to transfer their activities to the big cities. As an Algerian militant put it, if his fighters killed thirty soldiers in a village, this would be reported in a few lines on the back page of the world press, whereas the noise of even a small bomb in a big city would reverberate throughout the world and make headlines.

  Has there been more or less guerrilla warfare during the last two decades? The days of the classic, major guerrilla wars seem to be over, no new Mao or Ho Chi Minh, no Tito and no Castro have appeared in our age. The gradual liberation of territories, the establishment of counter institutions and the transformation of guerrilla bands into regular army units has been rare in our time. The war in Afghanistan is probably the only major exception; the list will also include Chechnya (1994-95), but one cannot think of many others. On the other hand, there is a long list of guerrilla wars which have not led to victory: This includes the Kurds in Turkey, the Karen in Myanmar, the rebels in Tajikistan and Southern Sudan, the Tamil in Sri Lanka, the EZLN (the neo-Zapatistas) in Mexico, Sendero Luminoso in Peru, Hizbollah in Lebanon, the various guerrilla groups in the Horn of Africa, various small Punjabi and Kashmiri groups, to mention a few. Some insurgents have used both guerrilla and terrorist strategies; this is true, for instance, with regard to Algeria. In other cases, regular armies have not been strong or well equipped and for this reason were compelled to apply, on occasion, guerrilla tactics as in the former Yugoslavia. The same is true with regard to civil wars as in Rwanda and Zaire. In fact, "pure" guerrilla warfare has become fairly rare. If Mao or Tito were to reappear they would probably not approve of the actions of their descendants, but it is not clear what advice they would offer to cope with conditions quite different from those in which they operated at the time; there is no big war in progress which provided welcome cover for the guerrillas sixty years ago.

  A review of strategies and the fate of guerrilla movements during the last two decades shows certain common features. In their great majority they consisted of nationalists fighting for independence whether against foreign occupants or against another ethnic group in their own country. Communism or Maoism did not play a key role as in the 1940s; true, Sendero Luminoso and the Mexican EZLN are social movements, but at the same time they are ethnic rebellions of Indians against the white upper and middle classes. The only exception is the Colombian FARC which at one time gave up armed struggle, but following its electoral defeat in 1992 it resumed it. However, the Colombians became involved with some of the drug cartels to improve their financial condition and while this might be justified from their point of view by pragmatic reasons it has nothing to do with the Marxist-Maoist tradition. Virtually all other conflicts are ethnic in essence except those carried out by Islamic fundamentalists (such as in Algeria) or against fundamentalist regimes (as in Sudan).

  Only in two major cases have guerrillas been successful, in Afghanistan and in
Chechnya. Victory was achieved because the rebels faced an enemy which had the power to smash the guerrilla but not the political will. These two guerrilla wars happened to coincide with the collapse of the Soviet empire; the Soviet Union had, of course, the power to destroy its enemies but the war was as unpopular as the Vietnam War was in the United States, nor was the regular army prepared for a guerrilla war. Topographical conditions in Afghanistan favored a guerrilla war and in addition there was a tradition of such a war in this country. The war had lasted for years until it was ended by an armistice which provided for the evacuation of all Soviet troops in 1989. However, there was no common front of Afghan resistance fighters which could have effected a smooth political transition. In these circumstances, facing a population tired by war and antagonized by the ambitions of rival war lords, the fundamentalist Taliban, with massive help from Pakistan, occupied Kabul (in October 1996) and large parts of the country.

  In most other instances guerrillas were less successful; they caused considerable harm to their enemies (as in Sri Lanka, Turkey, Algeria, Israel, and some other countries) but failed to gain decisive victories. In some instances guerrillas transformed themselves into political parties (as in Nicaragua and San Salvador) without, however, making significant political progress. The PLO and the African National Congress were more successful but they had not been primarily guerrilla organizations; to the extent that it had been a guerrilla organization the PLO had been totally defeated and compelled to leave Lebanon for Tunis. But it still made a political comeback not as the result of terrorist attacks but of mass action.

  Most guerrilla movements had substantial help from abroad and it is doubtful whether they would have been able to continue their struggle but for this assistance in money, arms, and by other means. This refers to the Afghan rebels and the Palestinians who received large amounts of money from the Arab states. The Tamil Tigers were supported by Tamils in India; the Chechens received Turkish help; the Algerian fundamentalists were helped by fundamentalists in the Arab world and Iran. Hizbollah in Lebanon receives its budget from Tehran. Taliban received not only arms but also money from Pakistan. Not much is known about the financial sources and resources of the Latin American guerrillas; they did not have much foreign help and were among the proletariat of the global guerrillas. But even they probably did get help from abroad even though they got most of their money from internal sources.

  Historical experience shows that guerrilla movements have prevailed over the incumbents only in specific constellations: If Chiang Kai-chek's government would not have been weakened by the Japanese invasion, if the Germans in the Second World War had been able to deploy more regular units in Yugoslavia, neither Mao nor Tito would have entered history as the great victors. There are exceptions such as Cuba under Batista where a regime in time of peace collapses as the result of its lack of popular support. But these are the exceptions, and in the current state of the world there have been few such exceptions. While the weapons of the guerrillas have only marginally improved, modern means of observation have become more sophisticated and effective. They still do not offer panaceas, whatever the advocates of modern technology may claim; much still depends on the terrain, the fighting spirit of the guerrilla, and other factors which cannot be quantified. But while small units can move as effectively as they could fifty or a hundred years ago, it is far more difficult for bigger units to assemble and operate. They have become more vulnerable than in the past, hence the great difficulties guerrilla movements have faced in seizing and holding territory and establishing a standing army. It could well be that the classical model of guerrilla warfare is no longer applicable in the modern world; even Mao admitted that what could be done in China might not be feasible in Belgium. Now it might not be possible in China.

  All this does not mean that tactics akin to guerrilla warfare have no future, but it signifies that they will probably be modified in accordance with technical developments. We may witness a combination of political warfare, propaganda, guerrilla operations, and terrorism, and, in some cases, this could be a potent strategy not in the most developed and densely populated countries but quite possibly in the rest of the world. It is too early to write off guerrilla warfare, despite the trend of urbanization all over the world, and the range of possibilities is almost endless. We may witness small groups of sectarians, religious or political, directing their aggression not inwards, that is to say, committing collective suicide, but outwards, against the rest of the world. We have certainly not seen the last of separatist guerrillas, provided topographical conditions favor this kind of warfare. A new criminal guerrilla cannot be ruled out for instance in collaboration with drug producers especially in Southeast Asia and Latin America. Such guerrillas may eventually have at their disposal very sophisticated weapons, including weapons of mass destruction, which would open new and dangerous prospects.

  These are trends and possibilities, not certainties. But it all means that in some parts of the world, at the very least, small wars will continue, even if big wars have become too expensive. And it is useful to remember that historically and etymologically guerrilla means precisely this—small war.

  Preface

  The present volume is the first part of a wider study which, I believe, has not been attempted before — a critical interpretation of guerrilla and terrorist theory and practice throughout history to the present age. This book deals with guerrilla warfare; it does not aim at presenting a universal theory, for such a theory would be either exceedingly vague or exceedingly wrong. The author of an excellent book on the Cuban revolution noted some years ago that in view of its unique character the events in Cuba were a subject for the historian rather than the sociologist. The same is true of most guerrilla wars: a tank is always a tank, but guerrilla wars differ greatly from one another. Throughout history unconventional warfare has been affected far more by indigenous political, social, cultural, and economic factors and, of course, by geography than has conventional warfare. But though one eschews sweeping generalizations there still are common patterns to be found and it is to the search for these patterns that this study is devoted. Hence the comparative approach, which has been used in this study in full knowledge of its limitations.

  My original intention was to write a general essay on the subject without dealing with details of guerrilla theory and practice. But the more I became interested in the subject, the more I became aware of how much spadework remained to be done. Excellent monographs exist on some guerrilla wars, others have been neglected hitherto, and there is no critical review of guerrilla doctrine available.

  The facts of guerrilla warfare have been covered by a vast overgrowth of mythology, and I have regarded it as one of my main tasks to distinguish the facts from the myths. The present study is therefore an attempt to demythologize guerrilla warfare, without belittling its importance. Fiction should not be disparaged; Balzac's Les Chouans, Tolstoy's Hadji Murat and Hemingway's For Whom the Bell Tolls perhaps convey a better picture of what it meant to be a partisan than many volumes of military history. But these novels deal with the fate of individuals; for an understanding of guerrilla war as a political and military phenomenon, fiction is of little value.

  A study of this kind faces considerable difficulties. It was necessary to go back to the sources, a laborious task since some of the material is no longer available even in the world's leading libraries: copies of Carlo Bianco's Trattato, of Le Mière's pioneering work, of J. Most's Revolutionaere Kriegswissenschaft, and other important sources quoted in this book are not to be found in either the British Museum or the Library of Congress. The search for rare books is arduous but it has its compensations. In any case, this was not my main problem. The guerrilla phenomenon, unless one regards it as a mere technique of warfare, has innumerable aspects and facets; so that even proposing a definition of the subject is exceedingly difficult.

  The term "guerrilla" was originally used to describe military operations carried out by irregulars agai
nst the rear of an enemy army or by local inhabitants against an occupying force. More recently it has been applied to all kinds of revolutionary wars and wars of national liberation, insurrections, peasant wars, and terrorist acts (such as hijacking airplanes or kidnappings). It has been applied to happenings in the theater and the arts, to certain activities in universities and even in kindergarten. In short, the term has become almost meaningless, partly as the result of indiscriminate use but also because there are, in fact, some real difficulties. Regular armies may use guerrilla tactics, but so may bandits; guerrilla movements have transformed themselves into regular armies but the opposite has also happened. Not all unconventional warfare is "guerrilla" war, nor should it be used as a synonym for revolutionary politics, civil war (such as in Lebanon and Angola), or terrorism.

  The tactics of guerrilla warfare are not very complicated, nor are they shrouded in mystery — they have been more or less the same, with slight variations, since time immemorial. Typical guerrilla operations include harassment of the enemy, evasion of decisive battles, cutting lines of communications, carrying out surprise attacks. Guerrilla tactics are based on common sense and imagination; they vary from country to country, are affected by geographical conditions, by social and political processes, and also change as the result of technological innovation. These developments are examined in some detail in the following pages. It is in the analysis of the political background to guerrilla warfare that most difficulties are encountered.

  Over the last two decades there has been a tidal wave of guerrilla literature. Some has been straight propaganda or hagiography bearing little, if any, resemblance to reality. Other books provide useful advice on how to conduct successful guerrilla warfare or, alternatively, how to combat it effectively. But they are of little help in explaining why guerrilla wars break out in certain circumstances and not in others, why some wars succeed and others fail. On the other hand, there have been a great many sociological and psychological studies of guerrilla motivation and behavior, often with a ponderous emphasis on methodology. This approach may perhaps one day produce some interesting new insights but that day has not yet arrived and it is not certain that it ever will. Thus, after a great many detours, the student of the guerrilla phenomenon finds himself back at his starting point: in order to explain guerrilla warfare one has to write its history.